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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL WAYNE PILLING

:

Defendant/Appellant•

Case No. 930577-CA

Priority 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Michael Wayne Pilling appeals from his conviction
of assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 1993).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

What is the meaning of "custody" for purposes of

determining whether defendant was a prisoner at the time he
assaulted a police officer?

This Court reviews a trial court's

interpretation of a statute for correctness.
817 P.2d 822, 826 (Utah App. 1991).

State v. Jaimez,

However, defendant failed to

present this question to the trial court and has therefore waived
appellate consideration of it.

State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359

(Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted).
2.

Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support

defendant's conviction of assault by a prisoner?

In determining

whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support a jury

verdict, this Court must "'review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury'" and may reverse "'only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he . . . was convicted.'"

State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473

(Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted).

However, defendant has not

marshalled the evidence in support of his conviction for assault
by a prisoner, nor shown that the marshalled evidence is so
inconclusive that a reasonable jury could not have convicted him;
therefore, this Court need not consider the merits of defendant's
claim.

State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah App.), cert,

denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993);

State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d at

473 (Utah App. 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional
provisions, statutes, and rules.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with aggravated assault by a
prisoner, a second degree felony; escape, a second degree felony;
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony; and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103.5 (1990), 76-8-309 (1990),
2

58-37-8 (Supp. 1993), and 58-37a-5 (1990) (R. 1). After a oneday trial, a jury convicted defendant of the lesser included
offense of assault by a prisoner, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5
(1990), and of the two possession charges (R. 28, 29, and 30).
Defendant moved to dismiss the escape charge because the State
had not shown that he escaped from a jail or other place of
confinement (Tr. 166). The State concurred in the motion, and
the trial court granted it (Tr. 166-67).
The trial court entered its judgment and commitment to the
Utah state prison on August 31, 1993, sentencing defendant to 0-5
years on the assault conviction, 0-5 years on the possession of a
controlled substance conviction, and 6 months on the possession
of drug paraphernalia conviction, with all sentences to run
concurrently (R. 42-43) . On appeal, defendant challenges only
his conviction for assault by a prisoner.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 4:30 a.m. on October 11, 1992, Officer Mark
Watkins received a call about a disturbance at an apartment
complex in Helper, Utah (Tr. 54-55).

After arriving at the

complex, Officer Watkins determined that the disturbance was
coming from defendant's apartment (Tr. 56-58).

When Officer

Watkins knocked on the door, defendant invited him into his
apartment and indicated that there were drugs in the kitchen (Tr.
60-63) . Officer Watkins could see the kitchen from where he was

3

standing and observed several syringes and a baggie with white
powder in it (Tr. 63-64) .
Officer Watkins twice advised defendant that he was under
arrest; defendant responded both times, "No, I'm not under
arrest," then ran into the bedroom (Tr. 64). Officer Watkins and
Officer Wood, who had answered Officer Watkins' request for backup, followed defendant into the bedroom, where defendant swung at
the officers several times (Tr. 65). Officer Watkins swung back
at defendant with his night stick, but did not hit him (Tr. 6566).

Defendant stopped swinging at the officers and began

mumbling and walking toward the bedroom door (Tr. 66). As
defendant began to walk past the officers, Officer Watkins
grabbed defendant by the shoulder and again advised him that he
was under arrest (id.).
The officers and defendant then walked into the living room,
where defendant put his hands behind his back and said, "Okay.
Okay. I'm under arrest" (Tr. 67). Officer Watkins held
defendant's left arm while Officer Wood attempted to apply
handcuffs to defendant

(id.).

However, the handcuffs

malfunctioned and Officer Wood removed his hand from defendant to
try to fix them (id.).

When he did, defendant "went down into a

- - a stance, pulled something from his crotch area, stood up and
hit [Officer Watkins] on the side of the head" (id.).
escaped from the officers, but was again apprehended
approximately five minutes later (Tr. 68-72).

4

Defendant

After taking defendant to the station house, Officer Watkins
went to Castleview Hospital where his cheek was X-rayed.

He was

advised that his cheek was badly bruised and possibly cracked
(Tr. 74). His front tooth was also chipped, but Officer Watkins
sought no treatment for that injury (Tr. 75).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's appellate challenge to his conviction raises two
issues: (1) what is the meaning of "custody" for purposes of
applying Utah's assault by a prisoner statute; and (2) does the
record contain sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that
defendant was in custody, and therefore a prisoner, at the time
he assaulted Officer Watkins.
Defendant concedes that he did not present the issue of the
proper interpretation of "custody" to the trial court.

He has

also failed on appeal to establish that the trial court committed
plain error.

Defendant argues that he could not have been in

custody at the time he assaulted Officer Watkins because the
officers had not succeeded in handcuffing him.

However, neither

the plain meaning of "custody", the interpretation of "custody"
in contexts similar to that at issue in this case, nor the
interpretation of "custody" applied in the context of police
interrogation imposes handcuffing as a requisite element of
custody.

Therefore, defendant has failed to establish either the

existence of error, or that any such error was obvious.
Defendant also has not established that there is
insufficient evidence to support his conviction of assault by a
5

prisoner.

First, he has failed to marshal all of the evidence in

support of his conviction, excluding some of the key evidence
supporting a conclusion that he was in custody at the time he
assaulted Officer Watkins.

Second, he has failed to show that

the marshalled evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the jury verdict, is so inadequate or inconclusive that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to
whether he was in custody.

To the contrary, defendant has simply

recharacterized the evidence in the light most favorable to his
appellate argument.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The jury convicted defendant of assault by a prisoner
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1990).

Section 76-5-101

(1990) defines "prisoner" to include "any person who is in the
custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest."

On

appeal, defendant argues that because he was not handcuffed at
the time he assaulted Officer Watkins, he was not in "custody",
and therefore not a prisoner within the meaning of the assault by
a prisoner statute under which he was convicted.

Appellant's

Brief at 7-9.
Defendant's argument requires consideration of two issues:
(1) what is the meaning of "custody" for purposes of Utah Code
Ann.

§§ 76-5-101 and 76-5-102.5; and (2) does the record contain

sufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict.

6

State

v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah App. 1993).

See also State

v. Sinah, 819 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah App. 1991).
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF THE PROPER
DEFINITION OF "CUSTODY", AND HAS FAILED ON APPEAL TO
SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF PLAIN ERROR IN THE WAY THE TRIAL
COURT INTERPRETED CUSTODY.1
Defendant concedes that he never presented this issue to the
trial court. Appellant's Brief at 9.2

Appellate courts

generally will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal.3

State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993)

1

Because defendant did not raise this challenge below, the
trial court did not expressly interpret the meaning of "custody."
In asking this Court to review his conviction for plain error,
however, defendant argues that under a proper interpretation of the
meaning of "custody" he clearly was not a prisoner, and that the
trial court should therefore have sua sponte either arrested
judgment or directed a verdict in his favor.
It appears that
defendant argues that the trial court plainly misinterpreted the
meaning of "custody" by not finding that he was not in custody as
a matter of law.
2

In admitting that he did not raise this issue below,
defendant argues that his trial counsel should have moved for
directed verdict or requested an instruction on the lesser offense
of Assault Against Peace Officer. Appellant's Brief at 9. In the
footnote, defendant cites Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) . However, defendant does not raise ineffective assistance
as a basis for reversal; he simply mentions Strickland in a
footnote.
3

Although conceding that he failed to raise this issue
below, defendant does state that he argued in the trial court that
he was not a prisoner at the time of the assault. Appellant's
Brief at 9-10 n.3. However, defendant does not and cannot argue
that the argument he presented below preserved his appellate
argument. Defendant's counsel argued to the jury that he was not
in custody because as defendant claimed, the officers did not tell
him he was under arrest until after the assault (Tr. 208) .
Defendant implicitly premised his argument on the assumption that
if the officers had told him he was under arrest prior to the
assault, defendant would have been a prisoner within the meaning of
the statute (id.). Thus, defendant's argument to the jury simply

7

(citations omitted) (applying the waiver doctrine to a
constitutional challenge to the statute under which defendant was
convicted).

Therefore, defendant must establish the existence of

plain error in order to justify appellate review of the merits of
his argument.

Id.

Defendant can succeed on a plain error

argument only if he can establish all three of the following
elements: (1) that the trial court erroneously interpreted the
meaning of "custody"; (2) that the error was obvious; and (3)
that the error was prejudicial, specifically, that the error
undermines this Court's confidence in the verdict.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).

State v.

Defendant has not met

this burden.
Defendant has not shown that the trial court erroneously
interpreted "custody" for purposes of the assault by a prisoner
statute, let alone that any such error was obvious.

The sum of

defendant's substantive argument on this issue reads as follows:
Section 76-5-101 and other relevant statutory
provisions do not define "custody." See id.
"Custody," however, entails, inter alia, being "within
the immediate personal care and control of the person
to whose custody it is subjected." Black's Law
Dictionary 347 (5th ed. 1979). Even according to
focused on the credibility of the witnesses.
By contrast, defendant argues on appeal that he could not have
been in custody as a matter of law because the officers had not
succeeded in handcuffing him at the time he assaulted Officer
Watkins. Appellant's Brief at 9. Counsel's closing argument was
not specific enough to preserve this appellate argument. See State
v. Rancrel, 920802-CA slip op. at 7 (Utah App. December 29, 1993)
(holding that while defendant's challenge to the application of a
rule of evidence to his case preserved for appeal the question of
whether the rule as applied violated due process, it did not
preserve the issue of the rule's facial constitutionality). See
also State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 360-61.
8

Watkins, Pilling was not within his immediate control
because Pilling had not been handcuffed at the time he
swung and hit Watkins in the face.4 See Tr.67.
Consequently, Pilling could not have been convicted, as
a matter of law, of assault by a prisoner, because his
conduct did not "fit within the statutory definitional
element of [the] crime.11 Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 573.
Appellant's Brief at 9 (emphasis added).

Apparently, defendant

argues that the plain meaning of "custody," as stated in Black's
Law Dictionary, defines that term for purposes of determining
whether he was a prisoner within the meaning of the assault by a
prisoner statute.
Admittedly, "statutory terms should be interpreted and
applied according to their commonly accepted meaning unless the
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is
either 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, [] or in blatant
contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'"
Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993).5

State v.

However, the

plain meaning of "custody" does not require police officers as a
matter of law to handcuff a person to render that person in
custody.

4

Officer Watkins did not testify that defendant was not in
his control; only that defendant hit him while Officer Wood was
trying to handcuff him. See Addendum C.
5

In Souza, this Court went on to indicate that "'if there is
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the
provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its
entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its
provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose.'"
Id.
Apparently believing that the plain meaning of custody controls,
defendant has not considered this additional principle of statutory
construction. Therefore, the State will not address this question.
9

First, even the truncated portion of the Black's definition
defendant quotes fails to support his argument.

According to

defendant, a person is in custody when he is in the "immediate
care and control" of another person.

Appellant's Brief at 9.6

However, exercising control over someone does not require
handcuffing that person or even an equivalent level of physical
restraint.

Webster's defines "control" to include "to exercise

authority over; direct; command".
309 (2nd college ed. 1968).

Webster's New World Dictionary

Black's defines "control" as

follows:
Control, v. To exercise retraining or directing
influence over. To regulate; restrain; dominate; curb;
to hold from action; overpower; counteract; govern.
Control, n. Power or authority to manage, direct,
superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer, or
oversee....
"Control," as used in statute making it unlawful
for any person to possess or control any narcotic drug,
is given its ordinary meaning, namely to exercise
restraining or directing influence over, and also has
been defined to relate to authority over what is not in
one's physical possession." Speaks v. State, 3 Md.App.
371, 239 A.2d 145, 147.
Black's Law Dictionary 298 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added).
The complete definition of "custody" in Black's further
supports the conclusion that handcuffing is not a requisite
element of "custody":
Custody. The care and control of a thing or person.
The keeping, guarding, care, watch, inspection,
preservation or security of a thing, carrying with it
the idea of the thing being within the immediate
6

The portion of the Black's definition of custody on which
defendant relies defines custody of property, not of persons.
10

personal care and control of the person to whose
custody it is subjected. Immediate charge and control,
and not the final, absolute control or ownership,
implying responsibility for the protection and
preservation of the thing in custody. Also the
detainer of a man's person by virtue of lawful process
or authority.
The term is very elastic and may mean actual
imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal
or physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual
possession. Term "custody" within statute require that
petitioner be " in custody" to be entitled to federal
habeas corpus relief does not necessarily mean actual
physical detention in jail or prison but rather is
synonymous with restraint of liberty. . . .
Accordingly, persons on probation or released on own
recognizance have been held to be "in custody" for
purposes of habeas corpus proceedings.
Id. at 347 (emphasis added).

(The relevant pages from Black's

Law Dictionary are attached as Addendum B.)

Thus, the plain

meaning of custody encompasses a restraint of liberty that
results either from some degree of physical restraint or from the
mere legal power to exercise physical restraint.

Even as to

physical restraint, however, the plain meaning of custody does
not specify a particular level of physical restraint and
certainly does not require handcuffing.
In interpreting their escape statutes, other jurisdictions
have found that "custody" exists for purposes of those statutes
even where police officers have not successfully handcuffed the
defendant, or imposed any more physical restraint on the
defendant than Officers Watkins and Wood imposed on defendant in
this case.

For example, in State v. Nakoa, 817 P.2d 1060 (Hawaii

1991), an arresting police officer told the defendant that he was
under arrest, to which the defendant responded, "yeah, yeah."
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The police officer then placed his hand on the defendant's back,
turned the defendant around, pushed him toward a stone wall, and
instructed the defendant to put his hands on the stone wall,
which the defendant did.

The officer kept one hand on the

defendant's back and reached for his handcuffs with the other;
however, before the officer could place the handcuffs on the
defendant, he jumped over the wall and ran from the officers.
The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the defendant was in "custody"
when he escaped even though the officer had not handcuffed him.
Id. at 1063-64.

See also State v. Cole, 838 P.2d 1351, 1352-53

(Ariz. App. 1992) (the defendant was under arrest, and therefore
in custody, for purposes of Arizona's escape statute where the
defendant was informed he was under arrest, and where the
officers temporarily physically restrained defendant by clutching
first his arms and then his shirt); State v. Solis, 685 P.2d 672,
674 (Wash. App. 1984) (holding that a defendant was in a police
officer's custody for purposes of Washington's escape statute at
the time that she grabbed the defendant's arm and told him he was
under arrest).
Although Utah case law has not defined custody for purposes
of the assault by a prisoner statute, the term is defined in the
context of police interrogations.

In State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d

897 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court defined custody to exist
"when any words or action of the police can reasonably be
construed as placing the subject under some substantial physical
or psychological control or restraint."
12

Id. at 899 (citation

omitted).

Physical restraint, let alone the physical restraint

associated with handcuffing, is not necessary to render a person
in "custody."
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that courts must
consider four factors in determining whether a custodial
interrogation has occurred: "'(1) the site of interrogation; (2)
whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and
form of interrogation.'"

State v. Wood, 900194 slip op. at 15 &

n.2 (Utah December 30, 1993) (quoting State v. Carner, 664 P.2d
1168, 1171 (Utah 1983) (establishing these four factors as those
necessary for consideration in determining whether questioning is
custodial for state constitutional purposes)).

Nothing on the

face of these factors requires handcuffing, or even physical
restraint.
Indeed, in earner, the Utah Supreme Court referred to the
absence of readied handcuffs, as opposed to handcuffs being
secured in considering whether the objective indicia of arrest
were present.

State v. Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171.

In State v.

Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), the court found that defendant
Bishop was in custody even though he was not physically
restrained, and even though he had not been told that he was
under arrest.

Id. at 460-62, 465. Thus, the Carner factors,

both on their face and as applied, do not require handcuffing or
equivalent physical restraint to render a person in custody.

13

Moreover, defendant has not even argued, much less shown,
that any error was obvious.

Nothing in the relevant statutes

expressly requires handcuffing as an element of custody.
Furthermore, the case law in this state defining custody when
reviewing a police interrogation has not limited custody to
situations where a defendant is handcuffed.

Therefore, nothing

would have indicated to the judge that it was obviously erroneous
to allow the jury to convict defendant under the assault by a
prisoner statute.
Based on the above, defendant has failed to show that the
trial court erroneously interpreted the assault by a prisoner
statute or that any such error was obvious, and therefore,
defendant has not met his appellate burden of establishing plain
error.7
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS NOT MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF
THE JURY'S VERDICT, NOR SHOWN THAT THE MARSHALLED
EVIDENCE, WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO
THE JURY'S VERDICT, FAILS TO SUPPORT HIS CONVICTION.
Defendant argues that the record lacks sufficient evidence
to support his conviction of assault by a prisoner.

Before the

Court may consider the merits of this argument, defendant has the
burden of marshalling all of the evidence in support of his
conviction, and of showing how, based on the marshalled evidence,
a reasonable jury could not have convicted him.
7

State v. Scheel,

Because defendant has failed to establish the first two
elements of plain error, he has also failed to establish the third.
State v. Brooks, 920853-CA, Slip op. at 11-12 (Utah App. January
12, 1994) .
14

823 P.2d 470, 472-73 (Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted).
Defendant has not made either showing.
Defendant does not identify in his argument any of the
evidence supporting his conviction.

Even if the Court considers

the evidence summarized in his statement of facts, defendant has
failed to marshal the following evidence supporting a conclusion
that he was in custody at the time he assaulted Officer Watkins:
(1) Officer Watkins testified that he advised defendant three
times that he was under arrest, with the third time occurring
after the officers had taken hold of defendant and just before
Officer Wood attempted to handcuff him (Tr. 64-66) (defendant
only identifies one of the earlier statements to defendant that
he was under arrest); (2) just before Officer Wood attempted to
handcuff defendant, defendant submitted to the officers' custody
by putting his hands behind his back and stating, "Okay. Okay.
I'm under arrest" (Tr. 67); and (3) Officer Watkins was still
holding defendant's arm, and therefore physically restraining
defendant, while Officer Wood attempted to handcuff him.
Defendant has also failed to meet the second prong of his
appellate burden: showing how the marshalled evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, is so
inconclusive or improbable that a reasonable jury could not have
concluded that he was in custody.

Id.

To the contrary,

defendant's argument amounts to nothing more than a
recharacterization of the evidence in the light most favorable to
his appellate argument.

Defendant represents that Officer
15

"Watkins testified that, after he advised Pilling he was under
arrest but before the arrest was actually effectuated, Pilling
hit him with an object on the head," and that "[a]ccording to
Watkins, Pilling was not in their custody at the time he struck
Watkins because the officers were still attempting to place him
in their custody."

Appellant's Brief at 11.

Contrary to

defendant's representation of the record, Officer Watkins did not
testify that he had not effectuated the arrest or that had not
taken defendant into custody.

The record citations on which

defendant relies only contain Officer Watkins recitation of the
events while the officers were attempting to handcuff defendant
(Tr. 66-67).

(These pages are attached as Addendum C.)

His

testimony only stands for the conclusion defendant draws from it
if the Court accepts defendant's argument that he was not in
custody because the officers had not successfully handcuffed him.
By drawing these conclusions from Officer Watkins' testimony,
defendant has done nothing more than recharacterize the evidence
in the light most favorable to his theory; he has not shown how
the marshalled evidence is so inconclusive that a reasonable jury
could not have convicted him.

Id. at 473 (holding that defendant

failed to meet his appellate burden where his brief "attempt[ed]
to reargue defendant's case by recounting a version of the facts
most favorable to defendant while ignoring" evidence that was
unfavorable).
Therefore, defendant has failed to meet his burden of
marshaling the evidence in support of the verdict or of showing
16

how the marshalled evidence is so inconclusive that reasonable
minds must have maintained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's
guilt.

As a result, defendant has failed to establish that the

record contains sufficient evidence to support his conviction of
assault by a prisoner.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, defendant has failed to show that his
conviction for assault by a prisoner is improper and the Court
should therefore affirm that conviction. ,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ft

day of February,

1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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an oral prescription, that is not obtained within ten days of the date
the prescription was written or authorized, may not be filled or dispensed.
(g) An order for a controlled substance in Schedules II through V for
use by an inpatient or an outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from
all requirements of Subsection (7) if the order is:
(i) authorized by the physician treating the patient and designates
the quantity ordered;
(ii) entered upon the record of the patient, the record is signed by
the prescriber affirming his authorization of the order within 48
hours after filling or administering the order, and the patient's record
reflects the quantity actually administered; and
(iii) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practicing his profession
within the physical structure of the hospital, or the order is taken
from a supply lawfully maintained by the hospital and the amount
taken from the supply is administered directly to the patient authorized to receive it.
(8) No information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an attempt to unlawfully procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled
substance is considered to be a privileged communication.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 6; 1972, ch. 21,
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 5; 1979, ch. 12, § 4; 1980,
ch. 6, § 39; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 15, § 96; 1985,
ch. 187, § 81; 1986, ch. 23, § 4; 1986, ch. 194,
§ 13; 1987, ch. 92, § 99; 1987, ch. 161, § 202;
1989, ch. 225, § 61; 1989, ch. 253, § 2; 1991,
ch. 198, § 3; 1993, ch. 39, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, rewrote Subsec-

tions (l)(a) and (2), rewrote the introductory
paragraph of Subsection (3)(a), rewrote Subsection (3)(b), rewrote the introductory paragraph
of Subsection (4)(a), and rewrote Subsection
(5)(a)
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993
inserted "denied" and made punctuator
changes in Subsection (4)(a)(iv)

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any persor
to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent tc
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub
stance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfei
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business a
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substance
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess sue]
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a license*
practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent t
distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect tc
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a secon
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subset
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony;
296

(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent,
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of
pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled substance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person is
using a false name, address, or other personal information for the
purpose of securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect
to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
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(ii) a substance classified m Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of
a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than
provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or
(iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through
(2)(a)(vii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person not
authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notification, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under
this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized
by this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are
independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly
or intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree
felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
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(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist,
veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or
obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to
disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source,
fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or
written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or
address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any application, report, or other document required to be kept by this chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, order, report, or record required by this chapter; or
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful
under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act,
or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
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(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (5)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where
the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been
served.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to,
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or
another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if
there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a minimum term to be
served by the defendant, of up to V2 the maximum sentence imposed by
law for the offense committed.
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time
of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no event
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later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or the
defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or a
later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or his
counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation of
the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is
otherwise recognized as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under Subsection (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous
or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following the
evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the defendant
has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for a showing
of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates
that probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b).
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the
substance or substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
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History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22,
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985,
ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92,
ft 100; 1987, ch. 190, I 3; 19SS, ch. 95, § 1;
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch.
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1;
1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990,
ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198,
§ 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment by ch. 161, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "to obtain a prescription for" and "or
failure by the person to disclose his receiving
any controlled substance from another source"
in Subsection (4)(a)(ii) and corrected two reference errors in Subsection (13).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, § 2, effective from April 23, 1990 until July 1, 1990,
corrected reference errors in Subsections (9)(a)
and (13Kb).
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, § 3, effective July 1,1990, substituted "Section 77-18-1"
for "Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure" in Subsection (9)(a).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 80, effective
April 29, 1991, in Subsection (5)(a), inserted
Subsection (ii), redesignated former Subsection
(ii) as (iii), substituted "or institution under

Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii)" for "under Subsection (5)(a)(i)" in Subsection (iii), inserted
Subsections (iv) through (viii), redesignated
formeT Subsections ttii) and i\\) as Ux) and ix),
and substituted "Subsections (5)(a)(i) through
(vii)" for "Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii)" in Subsection (ix); substituted "Chapter 37a, Title 58,
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act or Chapter 37b,
Title 58, Imitation Controlled Substances Act"
for "Chapters 37a or 37b, Title 58" in Subsection (13)(a); and added Subsection (14) (appearing as Subsection (13) after January 1, 1992).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 198, effective
April 29, 1991, substituted all of the present
language after "Schedules II through V" in
Subsection (lKaXiii) for "under an order or prescription," and made stylistic changes in the
introductory paragraph of Subsection (5)(a).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 268, effective
January 1, 1992, deleted former Subsection
(13), imposing a fee of $150 against each person convicted of, and each juvenile found
within the court's jurisdiction because of, committing an offense and providing for the use of
funds generated by the fee.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
1,000 feet of a public school are governed by
the statute and susceptible to its enhanced
penalties. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utah
1989).
The penalty enhancement provision of Subsection (5)(a)(iii) is not unconstitutional, since
the distinction between simple possession of
controlled substances and possession in proximity to a school is a valid one, reasonably related to the legislative purpose of creating a
drug-free environment around schoolchildren.
State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Admissibility of evidence.
Arranging sale.
Distribution.
—Distribution for value.
Evidence.
Possession.
—Amount.
Search and seizure.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
In accord with bound volume. See State v.
Pelton, 801 P.2d 184 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Subsection (5) does not violate a defendant's
due process rights by imposing an enhanced
penalty for violations that take place within
1,000 feet of a school. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d
497 (Utah 1989).
Subsection (5)(d), which eliminates lack of
knowledge about the aggravating factor's presence as a defense for the enhanced penalty,
does rvot violate due process. State v. Moore,
782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
Subsection (5) does not violate equal protection on the ground that it treats drug dealers
in small towns differently from those in large
cities, since all defendants state-wide who distribute a controlled substance for value within

Admissibility of evidence.
Evidence of defendant's possession of marijuana, similarly packaged, twelve days prior to
the offense charged, was properly admitted,
where the contested evidence was particularly
probative on the issue of constructive possession and was illustrative of defendant's common plan of marijuana distribution. State v.
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Arranging sale.
The offense of arranging the distribution for
value of a controlled substance does not require
the actual distribution. All that is needed is
the arrangement for such distribution, coupled
with knowledge or intent. Evidence of an actual sale may be helpful, or even necessary, in
proving knowledge or intent, but sale itself is
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(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use;
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use;
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use;
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed
distributor or dealer of tobacco products;
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object
to the total sales of the business enterprise;
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the
community; and
(13) expert testimony concerning its use.
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 4.
Cross-References. — Expert witnesses,
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 et seq

58-37a-5. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person
who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia.
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 5.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
act" means Laws 1981, ch 76, §§ 1 to 6, which
appear as §§ 58-37a-l to 58-37a-6

Cross-References. — Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301
Penalty for felonies, §§ 76-3-203, 76-3-301

734

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

76-5-102

PART 1
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
f6-5-101. "Prisoner" defined.
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who is in custody of a
>eace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other
»enal institution regardless of whether the confinement is legal.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-101, enacted by L.
973, ch. 196, § 76-5-101.

6-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to
do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102, enacted by L.
74, ch. 32, § 38; 1989, ch. 51, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1974,
. 32, § 38 repealed former § 76-5-102, as ented by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-102, relating
assault, and enacted present § 76-5-102.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-

ment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsection (l)(c).
Cross-References. — Bus hijacking, assault with intent to commit, § 76-10-1504.
Power of city to prohibit assault and battery,
§ 10-8-47.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
for assault by a convict with a deadly weapon.
State v. Duran, 522 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1974).

ANALYSIS

fFerent offense.
idence.
luded offenses.
ent.
ject of threat.
Victim.
rdict.
ed.

Included offenses.
In prosecution under former § 76-7-7, which
described offense of assault with intent to commit rape or mayhem, court had to instruct jury
that defendant could be convicted of simple assault; attempt to commit offense charged was
included in the offense under former Penal
Code definition of attempts. State v. Hyams, 64
Utah 285, 230 P. 349 (1924).
In prosecution for rape, it was not error to
charge that assault was an included offense
where the evidence would have supported a
finding of the elements of this crime. State v.
Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110 (1936).
Crime of simple assault was included in offense of indecent assault. State v. Waid, 92
Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937).
The offense of assault is a lesser included
offense of aggravated sexual assault, § 76-5405. State v. Elliott, 641 P.2d 122 (Utah 1982).

ferent offense.
Vhere jury returned verdict that defendant
j guilty of attempt to commit rape, court
Id not enter judgment that defendant was
Ity of different offense of assault with intent
ommit rape. State v. Hyams, 64 Utah 285,
P. 349 (1924).
dence.
Production of defendant's commitment pai to establish that defendant was an inmate
he state prison was proper in prosecution
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76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner.
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.5, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 33.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Assault against peace officer.
Evidence of assault.
-Sufficient.
kssault against peace officer.
This section and § 76-5-102.4 do not procribe identical conduct when the assault is
gainst a peace officer. The statutes apply to
ifferent classes of persons, the former applyrig to "any person" and the latter applying to
any prisoner." State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982
Utah Ct ADD
1989)
pp
*
Ividence of assault
Where, as part of standard jail procedure,

the videotape of all bookings, including the defendant's, was erased and recycled after 72
hours if there was no request to retain it, and
the defendant sought dismissal of the charge
that she, while in custody, had assaulted a police
officer, because there was no showing that
loss of the tape destroyed evidence vital to the
i s s u e of t h e
defendant's guilt, the trial court
erre
d in dismissing the assault charge. State v.
Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
«„#««•««•
— ^ u m cvi ee ri(Vc:t
^
" » implicitly rejecting statutory
defenses of self-defense and defense of habitation, was supported by the evidence. State v.
Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Ct. App. 1989).

6-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined
l Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L.
>73, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10;
>89, ch. 170, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendent, effective April 24, 1989, substituted
angerous weapon as defined in Section

76-1-601" for "deadly weapon" in Subsection
(l)(b) and made stylistic changes throughout
the section.
Cross-References. — Attempt, § 76-4-101.
Possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to assault, § 76-10-507.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

mgerous weapon.
jfense of habitation.
r
idence.
Sufficient.
iictment or information.
structions.
Flight.
ry question.
sser included offense.
mtal element.
ject of threat.

—Victim.

Recklessness,
Self-defense,
Serious bodily injury.
Threatening with dangerous weapon distinguished.
Voluntary intoxication,
Cited
Dangerous weapon.
Under former statute which described assault with deadly weapon, character of weapon
could be inferred from wounds or other indicia,
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ening manner, and a person convicted under
this section is not entitled to receive the misdemeanor penalty provided by § 76-10-506. State
v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862 (Utah 1979).
Voluntary intoxication.
A defendant's voluntary intoxication does
not preclude his conviction for aggravated assault since criminal responsibility for that
crime can be established through recklessness,
and voluntary intoxication does not absolve a

defendant of criminal responsibility for reckless acts. State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah
1985).
„. J . 0
,
Tjr.
m rt ^ J n
T
Cited in State v. Kirgan, 712 P.2d 240 (Utah
1985); State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403 (Utah
1986); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah
1988); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah
1988); State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah
1988); State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assault and
Battery § 48.
C.J.S. — 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery
§ 72.
A.L.R. — Kicking as aggravated assault, or
assault with dangerous or deadly weapon, 33
A.L.R.3d 922.

Fact that gun was unloaded as affecting
criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 507.
Criminal assault or battery statutes making
attack on elderly person a special or aggravated offense, 73 A.L.R.4th 1123.
Key Numbers. — Assault and Battery *»
54.

76-5-103.5. Aggravated assault by prisoner.
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a felony of the first degree, who
commits aggravated assault is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a felony of the first degree who
commits aggravated assault is guilty of:
(a) A felony of the first degree if no serious bodily injury was caused; or
(b) A capital felony if serious bodily injury was intentionally caused.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103.5, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 34.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Evidence.
It was permissible for the state to introduce
evidence of defendant's prior conviction to
prove an element of the offense for which he

was on trial, i.e., to show that he was in fact a
prisoner" at the time of the assault. State v.
Lancaster, 765 P.2d 872 (Utah 1988).

76-5-104. Consensual altercation no defense to homicide
or assault if dangerous weapon used.
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of this chapter or
assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that the defendant was a party to
any duel, mutual combat, or other consensual altercation if during the course
of the duel, combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601 was used.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-104, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-104; 1989, ch. 170, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted

"dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601" for "deadly weapon" and made minor
stylistic changes,
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76-8-308. Acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent criminal prosecution — Defense.
(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he:
(a) Solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for
his refraining from initiating or aiding in a criminal prosecution; or
(b) Confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon another as
consideration for the person refraining from initiating or aiding in a
criminal prosecution;
(2) It is an affirmative defense that the value of the benefit did not exceed
an amount which the actor believed to be due as restitution or indemnification
for the loss caused or to be caused by the offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-308, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-308.
Cross-References. — Bribery involving
tampering with or retaliation against a witness or informant, § 76-8-508.

Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding, § 76-8-509.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. Extortion § 1.
Key Numbers. — Extortion «=» 1.

76-8-309. Escape — Term for escape from state prison,
(1) A person is guilty of escape if he escapes from official custody.
(2) The offense is a felony of the second degree if:
(a) The actor employs force, threat, or a deadly weapon against any
person to effect the escape; or
(b) The actor escapes from confinement in the state prison. Otherwise,
escape is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) "Official custody," for the purpose of this section, means arrest, custody
in a penal institution, jail, an institution for confinement of juvenile offenders,
or other confinement pursuant to an order of the court. For purposes of this
section a person is deemed to be confined in the Utah state prison if he has
been sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or
voided or the prisoner is not on parole.
(4) The term imposed upon a person escaping confinement in the state
prison shall commence from the time the actor would otherwise have been
discharged from the prison on the term or terms which he was serving.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-309, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-309.

Cross-References. — Department of Corrections, Chapter 13 of Title 64.
Escape from state hospital, § 62A-12-226.
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CONTRIBUTIONE FACIENDA
Contribution facienda /kontrabyuwshiyowniy faeshiyanda/ In old English law, a writ that lay where tenants
in common were bound to do some act, and one of
them was put to the whole burthen, to compel the
rest to make contribution
Contribution to capital. A fund or property contributed
by shareowners as financial basis for operation of
corporation's business, and signifies resources whose
dedication to users of the corporation is made the
foundation for issuance of capital stock and which
became irrevocably devoted to satisfaction of all obligations of corporation See also Capital.
Contributory, n A person liable to contribute to the
assets of a company which is being wound up, as
being a member or (in some cases) a past member
thereof
Contributory, adj Joining in the promotion of a given
purpose, lending assistance to the production of a
given result Said of a pension plan where employees, as well as employers, make payments to a pension fund
As to contributory "Infringement" and "Negligence," see those titles
Contributory cause. See Cause; Contributing cause;
Negligence (Contributory negligence)
Contributory negligence. See Negligence.
Contrivance. Any device which has been arranged generally to deceive An instrument or article designed
to accomplish a specific objective and made by use of
measure of ingenuity
Control, v To exercise restraining or directing influence over To regulate, restrain, dominate, curb, to
hold from action, overpower, counteract, govern
Control, n Power or authority to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer, or
oversee
The "control" involved in determining
whether "principal and agent relationship" or "master and servant relationship" is involved must be
accompanied by power or right to order or direct
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v Vicars, 221
Ind 387, 47 N E 2d 972
"Control," as used in statute making it unlawful
for any person to possess or control any narcotic
drug, is given its ordinary meaning, namely, to
exercise restraining or directing influence over, and
also has been defined to relate to authority over what
is not in one's physical possession. Speaks v. State,
3 Md App 371, 239 A 2d 600, 604
Rule that driver must at all times have automobile
under control, means having it under such control
that it can be stopped before doing injury to any
person m any situation that is reasonably likely to
arise under the circumstances Kindt v Reading Co ,
352 Pa 419, 43 A 2d 145, 147
See also Exclusive control; Immediate control.
Controlled company. A company, a majority of whose
voting stock is held by an individual or corporation
Effective control can sometimes be exercised when
less than 50 percent of the stock is owned

Controlled substance. Any narcotic drug so designated
by law, i e so designated by federal or state Controlled Substances Acts (q v)
Controlled Substance Acts. Federal and state acts (the
latter modeled on the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act) the purpose of which is to control the distribution, classification, sale, and use of drugs The majority of states have such acts
Controller. See Comptroller.
Controlment /kantrolnwnt/ In old English law, the
controlling or checking of another officer's account,
the keeping of a counter-roll
Controver /kwitrowvw/ In old English law, an inventor or deviser of false news
Controversy. A litigated question, adversary proceeding in a court of law, a civil action or suit, either at
law or in equity, a justiciable dispute To be a
"controversy" under federal constitutional provision
limiting exercise of judicial power of United States to
cases and controversies there must be a concrete case
admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of legal rights of parties in an adversary proceeding upon facts alleged, and claims based merely upon
assumed potential invasions of rights are not enough
to warrant judicial intervention Southern Ry Co v
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engmemen,
D C Ga , 223 F Supp 296, 303 This term is impor
tant in that judicial power of the courts extends only
to cases and "controversies " See Case; Cause of
action; Justiciable controversy.
Controvert To dispute, to deny, to oppose or contest,
to take issue on
Contubernium /kontabarniyam/
In Roman law, the
mamage of slaves, a permitted cohabitation
Contumace capiendo /kdntameysiy kapiyendow/ In
English law, excommunication in all cases of contempt in the spiritual courts is discontinued by 53
Geo III, c 127, § 2, and in lieu thereof, where a
lawful citation or sentence has not been obeyed, the
judge shall have power, after a certain period, to
pronounce such person contumacious and in contempt, and to signify the same to the court of chancery, whereupon a writ de contumace capiendo shall
issue from that court, which shall have the same
force and effect as formerly belonged, in case of
contempt, to a writ de excommunicato capiendo See
Excommunication.
Contumacious conduct Wilfully stubborn and disobedient conduct, commonly punishable as contempt
of court See Contempt
Contumacy /kont(y)anwsiy/ The refusal or intentional
omission of a person who has been duly cited before
a court to appear and defend the charge laid against
him, or, if he is duly before the court, to obey some
lawful order or direction made in the cause In the
former case it is called "presumed" contumacy, in
the latter, "actual"
Contumax /kontamaks/ One accused of a crime who
refuses to appear and answer to the charge An
outlaw.
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Custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation, requiring that defendant be advised of his constitutional
rights, means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way; custody can occur without formality of
arrest and in areas other than in police station. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97
S.Ct. 1232. See Miranda Rule.
Custodiam lease /kastowdiysm Uys/. In old English
law, a grant from the crown under the exchequer
seal, by which the custody of lands, etc., seised in the
king's hands, was demised or committed to some
person as custodee or lessee thereof.
Custodian. General term to describe anyone who has
charge or custody of property, papers, etc.
Custody. The care and control of a thing or person.
The keeping, guarding, care, watch, inspection, preservation or security of a thing, carrying with it the
idea of the thing being within the immediate personal
care and control of the person to whose custody it is
subjected. Immediate charge and control, and not
the final, absolute control of ownership, implying
responsibility for the protection and preservation of
the thing in custody. Also the detainer of a man's
person by virtue of lawful process or authority.
The term is very elastic and may mean actual
imprisonment or physical detention or mere power,
legal or physical, of imprisoning or of taking manual
possession. Term "custody" within statute requiring
that petitioner be "in custody" to be entitled to federal habeas corpus relief does not necessarily mean
actual physical detention in jail or prison but rather is
synonymous with restraint of liberty. U. S. ex rel.
Wirtz v, Sheehan, D.C.Wis., 319 F.Supp. 146, 147.
Accordingly, persons on probation or released on
own recognizance have been held to be "in custody"
for purposes of habeas corpus proceedings.
See Chain of custody; Custodial interrogation; Protective custody.
Custody account. A type of agency account in which
the custodian has the obligation to preserve and safekeep the property entrusted to him for his principal.
Custody of children. The care, control and maintenance of a child which may be awarded by a court to
one of the parents as in a divorce or separation
proceeding. A number of states have adopted the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. See also
Guardianship.
Custody of the law. Property is in the custody of the
law when it has been lawfully taken by authority of
legal process, and remains in the possession of a
public officer (as a sheriff) or an officer of a court (as
a receiver) empowered by law to hold it. See Forfeiture; Seizure.
Custom and usage. A usage or practice of the people,
which, by common adoption and acquiescence, and
by long and unvarying habit, has become compulsory,
and has acquired the force of a law with respect to
the place or subject-matter to which it relates. It
results from a long series of actions, constantly repeated, which have, by such repetition and by unin-

CUSTOMARY SERVICES
terrupted acquiescence, acquired the force of a tacit
and common consent. Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Reverman, 243 Ky. 702, 49 S.W.2d 558, 560. An
habitual or customary practice, more or less widespread, which prevails within a geographical or sociological area; usage is a course of conduct based on a
series of actual occurrences. Corbin-Dykes Elec. Co.
v. Burr, 18 Ariz.App. 101, 500 P.2d 632, 634.
Parol evidence rule does not bar evidence of custom or usage to explain or supplement a contract or
memorandum of the parties. U.C.C. § 2-203.
Classification. Customs are general, local or particular. General customs are such as prevail throughout
a country and become the law of that country, and
their existence is to be determined by the court. Or
as applied to usages of trade and business, a general
custom is one that is followed in all cases by all
persons in the same business in the same territory,
and which has been so long established that persons
sought to be charged thereby, and all others living in
the vicinity, may be presumed to have known of it
and to have acted upon it as they had occasion.
Local customs are such as prevail only in some particular district or locality, or in some city, county, or
town. Particular customs are nearly the same, being
such as affect only the inhabitants of some particular
district.
Usage distinguished. "Usage" is a repetition of acts,
and differs from "custom" in that the latter is the law
or general rule which arises from such repetition;
while there may be usage without custom, there cannot be a custom without a usage accompanying or
preceding it. U. S. for Use of E & R Const. Co., Inc.
v. Guy H. James Const. Co., D.C.Tenn., 390 F.Supp.
1193, 1209. See also Usage.
Customarily. Means usually, habitually, according to
the customs; general practice or usual order of
things; regularly. Fuller Brush Co. v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 99 Utah 97, 104 P.2d 201, 203.
Customary. According to custom or usage; founded
on, or growing out of, or dependent on, a custom
(q.v.); ordinary; usual; common.
Customary court-baron. See Court-baron.
Customary dispatch. Due diligence according to lawful, reasonable and well-known custom of port or
ports involved. Context and conditions existing or
contemplated will, of course, affect the meaning of
the phrase. Taisho Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha v. Gano
Moore Co., D.C.Del., 14 F.2d 985, 986.
Customary estates. Estates which owe their origin and
existence to the custom of the manor in which they
are held. 2 Bl.Comm. 149.
Customary freehold. In old English law, a variety of
copyhold estate, the evidences of the title to which
are to be found upon the court rolls; the entries
declaring the holding to be according to the custom of
the manor, but it is not said to be at the will of the
lord. The incidents are similar to those of common
or pure copyhold.
Customary interpretation. See Interpretation.
Customary services. Such as are due by ancient custom or prescription only.

ADDENDUM C

1

A

2

It's a night stick with a handle on the side to

make a —

3

Q

Is it about that long?

4

A

Y e s , it i s .

5

Q

Okay.

6

that right?

7

A

8

It's what used to be called a baton; is

It's just an off--from a baton, a baton is just

straight, this has a handle 6ft the side.

9

Q

Okay.

10

A

I believe it's made of hard plastic substance.

11

Q

Okay.

13

A

H e then stopped.

14

Q

Did y o u actually hit him with that?

15

A

N o . N o t at that time.

16

Q

Okay.

17

A

H e then was mumbling and started walking toward

12

What is it made of?

What happened when you swung at him with

that?

18

What did he do after that?

the door, or the exit out of the bedroom.

19

Q

And did he move past y o u and the deputy, o r —

20

A

H e was starting to move past m e .

2i

I grabbed him

by t h e — t h e shoulder.

22

Q

23

And w h a t — d i d you say anything to him, or what

happened?

24

A

I advised him he was under arrest, again.

25

Q

What did y o u do then?

J
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1

A

He—we then walked into the living room and

2

Mr. Pilling stood there, put his hands behind his back and

3

advised , "Okay. Okay.

I'm under arrest."

4

Q

What happened then?

5

A

Deputy Wood, as I was holding Mr. Pilling1s left

6

arm, Deputy Wood was attempting to apply handcuffs on his--

7

on his wrists.

8
9

Q

And did something happen after that?

Was he

success ful in applying the handcuffs?

10

A

No.

He wasn'1.

11

Q

What happened?

12

A

Deputy Wood's handcuffs were malfunctioning, and

13

at that time, he removed his hand—Deputy Wood did, to fix

14

the handcuffs.

15

pulled something from his crotch area, stood up and hit me

16

on the side of the head.

Mr. Pilling went down into a—a stance,

17

Q

Did you see what he pulled out?

18

A

No.

19

Q

Did he pull it out from his pants or his pocket?

20

A

It was in that area.

21

Q

Okay.

22

A

It was a black blur, that's all I saw.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

In the left side of the face.

25

Q

Okay.

I didn't.

Describe what you saw.

And where did he strike you?

So, would he have used his right hand to
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